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Strategic Engagement and Religious Peace-building
A case study of religious peace work in Jerusalem
This article argues for the importance of a dia­logue for strategic engagement and presents an analytical approach to it with reference to three 
different peacebuilding strategies in terms of conflict 
resolution theories. As a case study example, the art­
icle presents three religious organizations engaged in 
peacebuilding in Jerusalem and explores the different 
strategies utilized by them. The article further argues 
that each single strategy possesses a danger of going 
wrong, at the same time as each single strategy is a vital 
component as part of a parallel process along with the 
others – to achieve the common goal of conflict trans­
formation.
Introduction
This article is based on a growing concern for coher-
ency among religious peace activists which caught 
my attention during my previous research on reli-
gious peacebuilding in Jerusalem in 2007–11. I had 
selected eight religious organizations, represent-
ing both Palestinians and Israelis and all the three 
Abrahamitic faiths, to study how they found encour-
agement in their sacred texts and faith to pursue peace 
in the Holy Land. At the beginning of my research I 
expected to find a religious peace movement consist-
ing of Palestinians and Israelis working together for 
the same goal. Unfortunately, what I found instead 
was a fragmented number of religious organizations 
which rarely saw the significance of the others’ work. 
Despite this general neglect of one another, it was 
obvious that each organization was engaged in some 
kind of peace work. By making a distinction between 
the different strategies as structural, cultural or elite 
peacebuilding, it was clear that each pursued conflict 
transformation.
The tendency I found in my own material is fur-
ther supported by previous research on interfaith 
dialogue among Israelis and Palestinians. In 2007 
Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Emily Welty and Amal I. 
Khoury voiced similar concerns: 
A clear distinction emerges between using a 
religious approach to deepen one’s faith and to 
understand other faiths, versus using religious 
beliefs as an instrument to reduce violence and 
preach for political coexistence. The analysis 
that follows shows how all three of the process 
models described above point to a clash – not 
of theologies, but of views on the relationship 
of religion and nationalism, or religion and 
politic al justice. (Abu-Nimer et al. 2007: 66)
According to this study these distinctions are speci-
fically related to differences between Israeli and Pal-
estinian participants, where Israelis generally see 
interfaith dialogue as a way of understanding one-
self and the other, while Palestinians see interfaith 
dialogue as a way of combatting political injustice.1 
Similar antagonisms were expressed when Arab lead-
ers met during a gathering in New York arranged by 
the United Nations in November 2007.2 During this 
conference the President of Libya said the following:
The effectiveness of the dialogue in question 
remains subject to the dynamics of asym-
metrical power relations … for how could any 
1 Although the Israeli organization Rabbis for Human 
Rights was an exception. Abu-Nimer et al. 2007: 
224–6.
2 See General Assembly of the United Nations 2008. 
This gathering and the response from the Arab lead-
ers are also mentioned in Wang 2009.
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dialogue flourish and progress where the Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian and Arab ter-
ritories persists, where the national and human 
rights of the Palestinian people are systematic-
ally violated? (Sleiman 2008)
Parallel statements, which demanded justice for the 
Palestinians and a solution to the question of Jeru-
salem before any dialogue could flourish, were given 
by King Abdullah II of Jordan (King Abdullah II of 
Jordan 2008), Mohammad Saed Tantawy from Egypt 
(Tantawy 2008) and the Prime Minister of Morocco 
Abbas El Fassi (El Fassi 2008).
In this way Israeli peace activists are generally 
excluded from interreligious dialogue in the Arab 
world, and this has also had a negative effect on peace 
work between Israelis and Palestinians.
This fear among Palestinians that cooperation 
and dialogue with Israelis will eventually preserve the 
status quo and the occupation is not new or limited 
to interreligious peace activism. In 1986 Edward Said 
gave voice to a common concern by questioning the 
value of dialogue in such an asymmetrical conflict as 
the Palestinian–Israeli conflict was (Jabri 1996: 155). 
Equally, a study by the Palestinian Mohammed Abu-
Nimer (1999) shows how the dialogue programmes 
implemented in Israel in the 90s did not lead to any 
social change for Arabs in Israel, but rather ‘reflects 
what the Jewish Zionist movement wishes to trans-
mit to Jewish youth for generations to come’ (ibid. 
160). In 2011 the Palestinian peace activist Aziz Abu 
Sarah3 published a chronicle in which he questioned 
the attitude of anti-normalization because it encour-
ages many Palestinians to deliberately reject any form 
of cooperation or dialogue with Israelis, for fear that 
such an outreach to the occupants might lead to a 
normalization of the occupation itself:
Anti-normalization is one of the hottest topics 
in the Palestinian community, although very 
few people can define exactly what it should 
mean. It is a term that gained strength in 
the 1980s against accepting the status quo of 
the occupation. Those who supported anti-
normalization then were concerned about the 
occupation becoming a secondary issue in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing number 
of Palestinians working for Israeli businesses, a 
3 Aziz Abu Sarah’s commitment and recognition as a 
Palestinian peace activist can be found online: for the 
address of his blog see the list of websites.
lack of political vision or a strategy for ending 
the occupation and the absence of the Pales-
tinian case from the international discourse 
were alarming trends for Palestinian activists. 
However, since the Oslo Accords ‘normaliza-
tion’ has become an out-moded term, a catch-
all argument against Israeli-Arab cooperative 
efforts and a cover for character assassination in 
Palestinian politics. (Sarah 2011)
Sarah further exemplifies how this fear of normaliza-
tion has led many Palestinians away from acknowl-
edging Israeli peace organizations who try to combat 
prejudices and put an end to violence. Sarah calls this 
kind of rejection the work of ‘armchair critics who 
complain about the occupation without taking action’ 
(Sarah 2011). He goes further and calls this attitude 
an obstacle to genuine peace work. Sarah encourages 
an opposition to occupation that acknowledges the 
outreach of Israeli peace activists: 
Cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians 
recognizing the goal of ending the occupation 
is an important act. It is not IPCRI and other 
types of joint Palestinian–Israeli organiza-
tions that Palestinians should be fighting, as 
some campaigns in the West Bank have been 
focusing on. It is the occupation. We as Pales-
tinians must rethink what is normal so that we 
can truly fight normalization, which is accept-
ing the status quo without action. Israelis stand-
ing hand in hand with Palestinians for freedom 
and human rights are brothers in arms and 
there is nothing ‘normalizing’ about that except 
common humanity. (Sarah 2011)
Thus, this statement encourages a new approach to 
resistance among Palestinians that includes cooper-
ation with Israeli peace activists.
The discussion above exemplifies the need to 
explore different strategies among Israeli and Pales-
tinian religious peace organizations. Thus, the ques-
tion this article asks is: how best to develop an ana-
lytical approach for strategic engagement in relation 
to religious peacebuilding? 
Dialogue for strategic engagement
Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall and Tom Wood-
house (2011: 394) suggest replacing dialogue for 
mutual understanding with dialogue for strategic 
engagement in intractable conflicts. Ramsbotham, 
73Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 
Miall and Woodhouse use the Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict as a case study to illustrate why this new 
approach is needed in intractable conflicts:
… what is to be done in intractable conflicts 
when dialogue for mutual understanding proves 
to be premature and systemic approaches to 
conflict resolution as yet gain no transaction? 
What when conflict parties refuse to distin-
guish positions from interests and needs, resists 
reframing competition into shared problem-
solving, will not convert adversarial debate into 
constructive controversy. (Ramsbotham et al. 
2011: 377)
To answer these questions they suggest looking in 
the opposite direction – by acknowledging, explor-
ing and understanding what lies at the heart of the 
radical disagreement, instead of dismissing rad-
ical disagreement in a premature search for mutual 
understanding. Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 
suggest replacing dialogue for mutual understanding 
with the promotion of dialogue for strategic engage-
ment. While Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse 
focus on general peacebuilding, my concern in this 
article is to understand how a focus on strategic 
engagement between Israeli and Palestinian religious 
peace activists can be helpful in understanding the 
relationship between the different strategies adopted 
by religious peace activists. The discussion put for-
ward here is based on the assumption that genius 
conflict transformation is dependent on the mutual 
success of three different strategies: cultural peace-
building, structural peacebuilding and elite peace-
building. (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 13–16)4
This article exemplifies the abovementioned 
range of strategies by conducting a case study of 
three religious organizations in Jerusalem. One is 
Palestinian, one Israeli and one Israeli-Palestinian. 
4 Ramsbotham and others (2011) also mention other 
strategies which are not mentioned in the context of 
this article on religious peacebuilding. These strate-
gies are peacekeeping and war limitation.
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Before I present these organizations, I will clarify the 
following central concepts: religious peacebuilding, 
structural-cultural and elite peacebuilding. Then I 
will make a suggestion as to how to monitor religious 
peace activism in a constructive way. 
Religious peacebuilding and peacebuilding 
Before the concept religious peacebuilding is discussed 
it is important to emphasize that the Israeli–Palestin-
ian conflict is not a religious conflict, but a territorial 
one (see, e.g., Breger et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the 
territory is sacred, and holy sites play a detrimental 
role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (see, e.g., the 
introduction in Breger et al. 2010; also Kelman 2004).
According to David Little and Scott Appleby, 
religious peacebuilding is a term used to ‘describe 
the range of activities performed by religious actors 
and institutions for the purpose of resolving and 
transforming deadly conflict, with the goal of build-
ing social relations and political institutions char-
acterized by an ethos of tolerance and nonviolence’ 
(Little and Appleby 2004: 5). According to Little and 
Appleby this process is meant to lead to a structural 
reform – where efforts are made to build institutions 
and foster civic leadership that will address the root 
cause of the conflict and develop long-term practices 
and institutions conducive to peaceful, nonviolent 
relations in the society. Following Little and Appleby, 
religious actors can serve in the post-conflict phase of 
the process, among others, as educators and institu-
tion builders. As educators they ‘… have a role to play 
during each of the stages of conflict transformation, 
whether it be to sensitize a society to inequities in 
the system; to foster the understanding and build the 
skills of advocacy, conflict resolution, democracy or 
living with diversity’ (ibid. 10). As institution build-
ers the religious leaders can develop strategies for 
opposing political and social injustice non-violently 
by drawing upon their religious traditions. Thus, fol-
lowing this definition of religious peacebuilding, it 
is clear that religious peacebuilders seek to change 
the conflict at both an institutional and social level 
of society. 
Religious peacebuilding occurs at several levels of 
society, just as contemporary peacebuilding does. In 
this connection I would like to present Renee Gar-
finkel’s report What Works? Evaluating Interfaith 
Dialogue Programs (2004).5 According to Garfinkel, 
5 This distinction between three different levels of 
interfaith dialogue programmes can be categorized 
according to the dimension of the participants’ occu-
pation:
Elites are people in top-level positions in 
politics, religion, academia, and other fields 
who have the potential to influence widely the 
group’s ideas, practice and values. Mid-level 
people whose occupations are thought to have 
an influence over smaller groups of people, in a 
more personal way. Mid-level programs might 
be aimed at teachers, for example, or local 
clergy. Grassroots participants or activists are 
individual citizens. Their experience is more 
intimate, having an impact on their families, 
friends, customers, and others with whom they 
have personal relationships. (Garfinkel 2004: 3, 
italics in original)
According to Renee Garfinkel, each of these three 
levels has a different impact on the people in a con-
flict area. While high-level religious leaders can 
speak for their whole communities and have a long-
term impact, the lower levels can have a more direct 
impact, although it will be basically limited to indi-
vidual change.
 Contemporary conflict resolution also distin-
guishes between cultural peacebuilding, structural 
peacebuilding and elite peacebuilding (Ramsbotham 
et al. 2011: 14–16). Conflicts can be perceived as a 
dynamic process in which ‘structure, attitudes, and 
behaviour are constantly changing and influencing 
one another’ (ibid. 11). Cultural peacebuilding is 
interested in the social relationships within a given 
society. Structural peacebuilding is interested in 
changing the structures – or institutions – in a con-
flict area which legitimate the conflict. Elite peace-
building is mainly conducted by the decision-makers 
or political authorities. Taking into account this div-
ision of peacebuilding, the main goal is nevertheless 
the same: conflict transformation. Ramsbotham, 
Miall and Woodhouse define conflict transform-
ation as the fundamental level of peacebuilding: ‘… it 
implies a deep transformation in the institutions and 
discourse that reproduce violence, as well as in the 
conflict parties themselves and their relationship. It 
corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and 
cultural peacebuilding’ (ibid. 31–2).
peacebuilding is also common within contemporary 
conflict resolution theory. See Ramsbotham et al. 
2011: 27.
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Following the discussion so far, it might be pos-
sible to suggest that religious peacebuilding can be 
conducted by means of a variety of strategies. As 
educators, religious actors can promote mutual 
understanding and develop the skills of living with 
diversity, and as such engage themselves in cultural 
peacebuilding. As institution builders they can 
oppose political and social injustices in the system, 
and as such engage themselves in structural peace-
building. In addition Garfinkel points out the signifi-
cant impact that top-level religious leaders can have 
within interfaith programmes, by widening the influ-
ence of the group’s ideas, practices and values, and as 
such they have an impact on elite peacebuilding.
 In the next section of this article I will exemplify 
how these three strategies are pursued by three differ-
ent religious organizations in Jerusalem.
Case-study example
The empirical material presented below was gath-
ered during my PhD work, carried out in 2007–11, 
and is based on interviews and documents from 
the organ izations (Wang 2012: 80–3). In this article 
I present a selection of the material from three of 
the eight organizations I studied during the course 
of my PhD research work as a case study example of 
the different strategies taken by religious peace activ-
ists in Jerusalem . The first organization I would like 
to present is Sabeel, which is a Palestinian Christian 
organization established in 1990 as a response to the 
first Palestinian Intifada, but also as a result of Israeli 
policies after 1967. Sabeel has developed a Palestin-
ian liberation theology which seeks to empower the 
Palestinian Christian minorities and implement non-
violent resistance to the occupation. The liberation 
theology of Sabeel is based on an understanding of 
Jesus as having himself lived under occupation; thus 
Sabeel affirms its commitment to make the gospel 
relevant ecumenically and spiritually in the lives of 
the local indigenous Church congregation:
Our faith teaches that following in the footsteps 
of Christ means standing for the oppressed, 
working for justice, and seeking peace-building 
opportunities, and it challenges us to empower 
local Christians. Since a strong civil society 
and a healthy community are the best supports 
for a vulnerable population, Sabeel strives to 
empower the Palestinian community as a whole 
and to develop the internal strengths needed for 
participation in building a better world for all. 
(Sabeel website)
As mentioned, the main concern of Sabeel is to 
develop a liberation theology for the Palestinian 
Christians. This is explained by the founder of Sabeel, 
Naim Ateek, as follows:
The message of Jesus acquires renewed rel-
evance. His message of justice and liber-
ation helps us focus on the inequalities and 
discrimin ation that are apparent within the 
society. At the same time we need to consider 
the obstacles that stand in the way of achieving 
a just peace in the political realm. (Ateek 2009)6
According to Naim Ateek, the need to develop a new 
liberation theology for the Palestinian people arose 
as a result of the pain they experienced after occu-
pation and with the emergence of western Christian 
Zionist supporters of the settlers. Thus, it also seeks 
to develop an inclusive land theology in some way 
as a counter-theology to religious Zionism – both 
Christian and Jewish. Sabeel represents a minority 
group in relation to both Palestinians and Israelis. 
It seeks dialogue and cooperation with Palestinian 
Muslims in order to empower the Palestinian Chris-
tian community. On the other hand, it is opposed to 
dialogue with the Israelis, and believes dialogue only 
can start after an end to occupation. The director of 
Sabeel, Naim Ateek argues that a divine paradigm for 
reconciliation is impossible in the present conflict 
and therefore suggests a human paradigm, effected 
by means of six steps. In Ateek’s final chapter ‘From 
6 Similar statements on how a Palestinian liberation 
theology must focus on the life of Jesus in the Gospel 
are made in Ateek 2003: 2.
Naim Ateek, director of Sabeel. 
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justice to forgiveness’ he presents these six steps, 
which need to be taken before a final reconciliation 
and forgiveness process can take place. They can 
briefly be listed as follows: 
1. Confront and analyse the roots of the conflict – 
to listen to and understand the two narratives of 
the conflicting parties. 
2. Israeli occupation must end and Palestinian 
violence stop. And it is also important to under-
stand the Palestinian violence as a response to 
Zionism. 
3. Justice must be done in accordance with inter-
national law and Israel must be willing to make 
amends and offer restitution.7 
4. The real work begins when justice has been 
established, to end all violence on both sides. 
5. Healing can begin by means of a long process.  
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission should 
be established to review the history of the con-
flict. 
6. Forgiveness is the final step in the process of 
healing. (Ateek 2008: 185–6)
7 The importance of justice is strongly emphasized in 
Ateek’s first book as a prerequisite for peace; Ateek 
1989: 177.
According to this process Israeli occupation must 
end before healing and dialogue can begin.8
The second organization dealt with here is the 
Israeli Interfaith Encounter Association (IEA) 
founded in 2001 by the Orthodox Jew Yehuda Stolov 
as an interreligious organization in Israel engaged 
in religious dialogue through face-to-face encoun-
ters. The encounters are held in private homes on 
both sides of the border, and address religious issues 
such as holy sites, high holidays, religious ethics and 
values . It seeks to be a human component of peace, 
and to challenge the exclusivity of political discourses 
and obstacles by ignoring them completely, thereby 
showing how individuals can be friends even among 
the most extreme groups. It has managed to assemble 
an encounter group including Palestinians from Abu 
Dis and Jewish settlers from Maale Adumim. The 
approach and strategy of the IEA is formulated by the 
director as follows:
This is why I believe that any political agree-
ment won‘t be sustainable without plowing both 
societies to overcome these negative stances: We 
need to turn to mutual understanding, respect, 
friendship and mutual trust – without these it is 
impossible really to maintain life together over 
an extended period of time … when we have 
achieved these things, I think it will be possible 
to accomplish political agreements fairly easily 
and that they will be sustainable. (‘Interview 
with Yehuda Stolov’ 2009)
Stolov further argues that the ongoing political con-
flict between Israelis and Palestinians has developed 
more towards a psychological conflict than one of 
rational disagreement. Stolov believes religion has 
the potential to change relationships:
The problem that we are facing in the Holy 
Land today is not a mathematical problem, 
on how to divide the land, it’s a psychological 
problem. It’s not part of the rational reality, it 
is part of the, what you say, the human reality. 
And I think this is where many peace organiza-
tions have gotten it wrong. And of course, many 
of the peace organizations are very secular 
oriented, and because of that they fail to see the 
8 Sabeel is presented in my thesis How Can Religions 
Contribute to Peace in the Holy Land (Wang 2012: 
114–27).
Yehuda Stolov, director of IEA. 
77Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 
potential of religion. (Interview with Stolov in 
Wang 2012: 162)
During the encounters between Jews, Muslims and 
Christians every dimension of religion is explored 
in a personal setting. Religious issues such as sacred 
narratives and figures, reconciliation and forgiveness 
in the sacred texts or holidays in the three traditions 
are explored. The IEA also conducts a programme 
called ‘Cross-Cultural Study Visits’ where they visit 
sacred sites together to understand the significance 
of holy places for the religious other. The IEA works 
to form several encounter groups among Jews, Mus-
lims and Christians living in both Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. The aims of the groups are to 
develop good relationships between Jews, Muslims 
and Christians in each community, and thus form 
a mini-community, characterized by mutual under-
standing and respect. The idea is that the work done 
in the Israeli state will form an inner circle, while 
the dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis is the 
next circle, and further a dialogue between Israel and 
the Middle East another circle (Interfaith Encounter 
Association 2009): 
Unlike most other dialogue organizations, we 
work with, rather than around, the deep cul-
tural roots, beliefs, and traditions of the peoples 
of the Middle East. Each encounter is centred 
on a religious theme and features a carefully 
planned program of joint study and dialogue. 
The group then coalesces into a single commu-
nity that respects the unique identity of each of 
its ‘sub communities’ and participants, which 
helps create a long-term process of grassroots 
peace building. By constructively engaging with 
core religious and cultural values, while explic-
itly discouraging partisan bickering that might 
close off constructive dialogue, our approach 
successfully involves social and political groups 
that may feel very uncomfortable with other 
approaches. (Interfaith Encounter Association 
2008)
In this way the IEA is engaged in a long-term project 
to transform the societies and relationships among 
members from the three monotheistic faiths living 
in Israel, Palestine or the Middle East (Wang 2012: 
158–69).
The third organization is not really an organ-
ization, but rather an Israeli–Palestinian consulta-
tive body representing the highest official religious 
authorities in the Holy Land, encompassing two 
peoples and three religions (Wang 2012: 13). The 
member institutions of the Council of Religious 
Institutions of the Holy Land (CRIHL) are the Chief 
Rabbinate of Israel, The Heads of the Local Churches 
of the Holy Land, The Ministry of Islamic Waqf at the 
Palestinian Authority, and the Islamic Sharia Court 
of the Palestinian Authority. The CRIHL presents its 
main task as follows:
As religious leaders of different faiths, who 
share the conviction in the one Creator, Lord 
of the Universe; we believe that the essence of 
religion is to worship God and respect the life 
and dignity of all human beings, regardless of 
religion, nationality and gender.
We accordingly commit ourselves to use our 
positions and good offices, to advance these 
sacred values, to prevent religion from being 
used as a source of conflict, and to promote 
mutual respect, a just and comprehensive peace 
and reconciliation between people of all faiths 
in the Holy Land and worldwide. (CRIHL 2010)
This statement is further elaborated through five 
goals listed by CRIHL: 
1. To be an open channel of communication 
between the Israeli and Palestinian institutional 
religious leadership;
2. to ensure a working relationship with the Gov-
ernment of Israel and the Palestinian Authority;9 
3. to promote mutual acceptance and respect 
among the religious communities through dia-
logue, education and the media; 
4. to promote respect for the holy sites of each reli-
gious community; and 
5. to engage religious leaders internationally.10 
In 2007 CRIHL produced a document which clarifies 
some guiding principles behind the communication 
between the member institutions. The document lists 
four aims: 
9 This means the Palestinian authorities in the West 
Bank, not Gaza.
10 The text of this list has been shortened by me. For the 
whole text see CRIHL 2010.
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1. Ensuring that my statements emphasize the value 
of our collective effort and the fact that we are 
working to improve the atmosphere of dialogue 
between one another. 
2. Avoid any public statement that could endanger 
our ability to work together. 
3. Discuss the details of those matters upon which 
we most deeply disagree in our private meetings 
and not in public. 
4. Emphasize the importance of our dialog and the 
good will between us despite our differences. 
(CRIHL 2007a)
In this way disagreements are not meant to reach the 
public sphere; only joint statements do so (CRIHL 
2007b). The document further acknowledges the dif-
ferent needs of Israelis and Palestinians by saying: 
‘Palestinians yearn for the end to occupation and 
for what they see as their inalienable rights. Israelis 
long for the day when they can live in personal and 
national security. Together we must find ways of 
reaching these goals’ (ibid.). The CRIHL’s mission is 
to be a religious partner in the political peace process 
by giving advice on issues related to religion.
The CRIHL is currently conducting three public 
projects. The first project is called ‘Universal Code 
of Conduct on Holy Sites Pilot’. The purpose of the 
project is ‘safeguarding all Holy Sites in the region 
from being abused for political and hateful pur-
poses’ (see CRIHL 2011). The second project is the 
‘Israeli–Palestinian Schoolbook Project’ launched in 
August 2009, and which for the first time creates a 
joint Israeli–Palestinian research team to study the 
‘portrayal of the other’ in Palestinian and Israeli 
schoolbooks. The programme is also followed up by 
a scientific advisory panel, consisting of European, 
American, Israeli and Palestinian experts. The study 
focuses upon all aspects of the other, such as its his-
torical, religious, personal and political dimensions 
(CRIHL 2009). The study was published on 4 Feb-
ruary 2013 (Zeveloff 2011). The third project is to 
empower young religious leaders to engage in fruit-
ful dialogue and cooperation among Israelis and Pal-
estinians from the three Abrahamitic faiths (CRIHL 
2013). 
Analysis
In the following analysis I will first try to situate 
the respective strategy of each of the three religious 
organizations as it orients towards peacebuilding. 
Next I will discuss how each of these different strat-
egies on the one hand counteracts the other strat-
egies, while on the other hand is mutually depend-
ent on the others to achieve conflict transformation. 
Finally, I present an analytical approach to a dialogue 
for strategic engagement.
Following the definition of religious peacebuild-
ing as developed by Little and Appelby, Sabeel is 
engaged in religious peacebuilding as it seeks to 
build ‘political institutions characterized by an ethos 
of toler ance and nonviolence’ (Little and Appelby 
2004: 5). The process of its work is meant to lead to 
a structural reform which will end the occupation 
by means of nonviolent resistance and by sensitizing 
‘society to inequities in the system’, as described by 
Little and Appelby (ibid.). Sabeel works at what Gar-
finkel calls ‘the mid-level’ with religious leaders, but 
also at the grassroots level by engaging youth groups 
and members of the churches (see below). Follow-
ing the distinction between three different kinds 
of peacebuilding, Sabeel is engaged in structural 
peacebuilding through nonviolent resistance against 
occupation. As religious peacebuilders Sabeel find 
strength and encouragement in the Christian faith 
and sacred texts to resist and challenge inequalities 
and work for an end to Israeli occupation. Sabeel 
works among people at both the grassroots and mid-
levels of society .
Secondly, I would like to address the same ques-
tion in relation to the Israeli organization the Inter-
faith Encounter Association. The IEA is engaged 
in religious peacebuilding, with ‘the goal of build-
ing social relations’ (see Little and Appelby 2004: 
5) which it is believed will eventually put an end to 
the conflict. By emphasizing the religious dimension 
of forgiveness and reconciliation among the three 
Bishop Munib Younan, representing The Heads of the 
Local Churches of the Holy Land in CRIHL, Jerusalem.
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Abrahamitic faiths, without ignoring differences in 
these three trad itions, the IEA also draws ‘upon their 
religious tradition’ (ibid. 10). Following Garfinkel, the 
IEA works at the grassroots level by engaging com-
mon people from all kinds of professions. In relation 
to contemporary conflict resolution theory, the IEA 
enacts cultural peacebuilding, and has – as we have 
seen – been able to arrange meetings between Pal-
estinians from Abu Dis and Jewish settlers, perhaps 
mainly because it does not discuss politics. By explor-
ing common religious issues the IEA has managed to 
break down prejudices and stereotypes between the 
two peoples and three faiths and thus pursue a cul-
ture of peace and coherence. The IEA works mainly 
among people at the grassroots level of society.
The third organization I would like to address 
is the Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy 
Land. As we have seen this council represents the 
highest religious authorities among Jews, Muslims 
and Christians in Israel and on the West Bank. The 
CRIHL works at what Garfinkel would call the elite-
level of religious peacebuilding (Garfinkel 2004: 3) 
as they function as a council for the political author-
ities in relation to questions affecting the religious 
communities. Its statement also clearly situates the 
Council within religious peacebuilding, as it is ‘draw-
ing upon their religious tradition’ to promote good 
and sustainable relations (Little and Appelby 2004: 
10). It can be argued that the CRIHL works at the 
elite level of peacebuilding through its consultation 
with polit ical leaders regarding specifically holy sites. 
From the presentation above we have seen how it 
seeks to take both the Palestinians’ need for an end to 
occupation and the Israelis’ concern for security into 
consider ation and as such supports both structural 
and cultural peacebuilding. In this way it acknowl-
edges the fear behind the so-called ‘stigma of nor-
malization’ (Sarah 2011) and also the need to enter 
into dialogue to promote trust and confidence among 
the two peoples . In this way, the three organizations 
presented here exemplify how religious peacebuild-
ing can promote structural, cultural and elite peace-
building.
On the other hand, each of the strategies adopted 
by the religious organizations runs the risk of coun-
teracting the others at some point. First of all, Sabeel 
rejects any dialogue with Israelis until a political 
agreement is reached and amends and restitution 
are made in accordance with international law. By 
resisting dialogue Sabeel counteracts cultural peace-
building which is vital to end misconceptions and 
prejudices with regard to the others. It can be argued 
further that purely structural peacebuilding, that 
raises a critical voice against the occupiers might also 
reproduce the conflict. By clearly resisting cooper-
ation and dialogue with the other, Sabeel might situ-
ate itself among those whom Aziz Abu Sarah argues 
are trapped in ‘the stigma of normalization’, who do 
not distinguish between dialogue among Israeli and 
Palestinian peace organizations, and dialogue with 
general Israeli institutions. This means that although 
Sabeel is engaged in a positive process with the work 
of nonviolent resistance through structural peace-
building, it might be counterproductive in reproduc-
ing stereotypes and misconceptions of the other.
To return to the second organization presented 
here, it may be said that the Interfaith Encounter 
Association (IEA) is engaged in cultural peacebuild-
ing, but by ignoring political disagreements which 
might be critical to the structure between the parties 
in conflict, it ignores the importance of engaging in 
structural peacebuilding. In this way the IEA runs the 
risk of making the error of ignoring a key fear among 
Palestinians, which, as we have seen, is that dialogue 
will only normalize the occupation. Nevertheless, the 
decision to adopt this strategy is taken consciously 
to break the ongoing negative discussion in politics 
by showing how friendship can develop when polit-
ical disagreement is left behind. The IEA believes 
that only when such friendship has developed can 
the two peoples be able to find good and sustainable 
solutions (Interview with Yehuda Stolov 2009). Nev-
ertheless, it is clear that the different strategies taken 
by Sabeel and the IEA work in different directions. 
While Sabeel believes that nonviolent resistance will 
lead to a political agreement and open the way for 
dialogue and reconciliation, the IEA believes that 
interreligious dialogue will lead to good relations 
which eventually will make it easy to find a sustain-
able political agreement.
The Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy 
Land (CRIHL) seems to acknowledge the different 
needs among Israelis and Palestinians, and thus the 
different strategies taken. When the CRIHL states 
that for the Palestinians an end to the occupation is a 
necessity, it is possible to argue that structural peace-
building is the best way of achieving that goal. While 
at the same time the CRIHL states that Israelis need 
security, it is further possible to argue that cultural 
peacebuilding is the best strategy for achieving that 
goal. Thus, the CRIHL seems to manage to under-
stand and promote these different needs and strat-
egies. On the other hand, as a council for the top tier 
of religious leadership, the Council does not make 
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any public announcement unless the members of the 
Council have managed to reach an agreement. Thus, 
the CRIHL runs the risk of falling into the error of 
not offering public statements when a crisis occurs, 
and in this way not assisting the grassroots or mid-
levels of religious peacebuilding in a constructive 
way at such difficult times. Thus, the discussion so far 
makes it possible to argue that each of the strategies 
is potentially mutually counterproductive if left on its 
own. This means that while structural, cultural and 
elite peacebuilding are all needed to achieve conflict 
transformation, each alone possesses the danger of 
being counterproductive.
The analysis shows how each of the organizations 
presented here run the risk of going wrong if they 
are conducted in isolation from the others – which 
leads us to the concept of conflict transformation. 
Conflict transformation is, as mentioned, the fun-
damental task of structural and cultural peacebuild-
ing (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 31–2). On the other 
hand, this article argues that Ramsbotham, Miall 
and Woodhouse’s suggestion of replacing dialogue 
for mutual understanding with the promotion of 
dialogue for strategic engagement should be further 
developed. Instead of replacing dialogue for mutual 
understanding it should focus on strategic engage-
ment and make a clear distinction between cultural, 
structural and elite strategies for peacebuilding, 
viewing each strategy as a process which is depend-
ent upon the others. The focus on strategic engage-
ment can function as an analytical approach which 
is able to reconsider the relationship between these 
three different strategies and how together they can 
promote conflict transformation. Thus, the argument 
in this article is that a focus on strategic engagement 
is vital for an understanding and effective analysis 
of how different peace-organizations relate to one 
another. In other words, the approach of these three 
different organizations can be divided into three dif-
ferent strategies, each of which emphasize a unique 
approach towards religious peacebuilding, at the 
same time as each is dependent on the others.
The first strategy is cultural peacebuilding. As a 
strategy within religious peacebuilding it can pro-
mote interreligious dialogue among the parties in 
conflict and as such breaks down stereotypes and 
prejudice in relation to ‘the other’ – not just the reli-
gious other, but also the other in the conflict. On the 
other hand, cultural peacebuilding on its own runs 
the risk of being counterproductive if it ignores the 
structural injustices inherent in the conflict. Cultural 
peacebuilding is also dependent on elite peacebuild-
ing, which can produce a final political agreement 
and further advance cultural peacebuilding.
The second strategy is structural peacebuilding. 
As a strategy within religious peacebuilding it can 
draw on its religious traditions and calling in order 
to put an end to injustice and empower the weaker 
social elements in the conflict. On the other hand, it 
also runs the risk of going wrong if it ignores hostil-
ity and prejudices among the parties and thus uncon-
sciously reproduces the conflict by its criticism. Just 
as with cultural peacebuilding, structural peace-
building is dependent on the other two strategies to 
promote conflict transformation.
The third strategy is elite peacebuilding. As a 
strategy within religious peacebuilding religious 
leaders can play a vital role as a consultative body 
for politicians on religious matters. Religious leaders 
also have a prominent and influential voice, which 
makes their collective impact greater. Neverthe-
less, to gain a sustainable peace this approach is also 
dependent on cultural and structural peacebuilding 
strategies, as these two strategies can reach the mid- 
and grassroots levels in a more direct and profound 
ways. Thus, religious peacebuilding can be conducted 
through these different strategies, but each strategy is 
mutually dependent on the other.
The effectiveness of conflict transformation is 
dependent on the strength of how these three strat-
egies correspond to and acknowledge each other’s 
agendas. On the other hand if only one or two of 
these strategies are missing the whole peace process 
might be in danger of collapsing at some point. Thus, 
a focus on a dialogue of strategic engagement can be 
a useful method and an analytical approach to situate 
the respective organization’s strategy, its limitations 
and its unique role in the complex process towards 
conflict transformation. By emphasizing each strat-
egy in relation to both the positive potential of the 
strategy and the risk of going wrong, a greater aware-
ness of these dangers might be clarified in the an alysis 
of religious peace work.
Conclusion
The title of this article is ‘Strategic engagement and 
religious peacebuilding’ and the key word for con-
structing a fruitful relationship between different 
religious organizations engaged in peacebuilding is – 
strategy. This article relies upon the assumption that 
conflict transformation can mainly be achieved and 
sustained when cultural, structural and elite peace-
building strategies cooperate and fulfill each other’s 
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agendas. Religious peacebuilding is a vital dimension 
of peacework in the way it can sustain all these three 
strategies within peacework, and also include the 
religious dimension needed in any conflicts which 
involve the religious communities.
 I would like to quote excerpt from Vivienne Jabri 
back in 1996 which I find relevant in this context:
One means by which conflict resolution may 
be defined … is to state that this is a condition 
where it is recognized that each interpretation 
of a text, be that a poem, a novel, a painting, 
an interpretation of history, a myth, must be 
dependent on the individual drawing upon the 
depths of experience, which differ from individ-
ual to individual and across time and context. 
Conflict resolution is thus recognition of the 
multiple and shifting identities of individuals all 
of which constitute the basis of communication 
action. (Jabri 1996: 119–20)
Jabri thus refers to conflict resolution as a condition 
which must recognize multiple and shifting identities 
– and here I would add multiple and shifting strat-
egies. A dialogue for strategic engagement should 
include openness towards how different strategies 
might be suitable for certain groups, while others will 
be more comfortable with a different strategy. The 
road towards peace might be different for Jewish set-
tlers from that of Palestinian members of Hamas, and 
a different strategy might be needed for Palestinian 
and Israeli academics working at the same Univer-
sity. In addition, as the CRIHL states, Palestinians 
need an end to occupation, which requires structural 
changes, while Israelis need national security, which 
requires the trust and confidence which dialogue can 
offer. Still, the three dimensions of peacebuilding – 
that peace work consists of structural, cultural and 
elite peacebuilding must not be ignored, nor the fact 
that if one of these approaches is missing it might 
be counterproductive. Thus, a dialogue of strategic 
engagement might be a fruitful analytical approach 
because it can evaluate diversity and cultural, struc-
tural and elite peacebuilding as mutually inclusive 
strategies to pursue the common goal of conflict 
transformation. 
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